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NOTES AND COMMENTS

contend, in the face of the Forbes and Rickman cases, that he could not
"reopen" the value so as to offer his evidence that the pearls were of
lesser value.
MILTON SHORT.
Taxation-Powers of Appointment-Will Contests-Taxation
of Property Passing under Compromise of Attempted
Testamentary Exercise of Power of Appointment
Decedent, Zachary Smith Reynolds, died at the age of twenty,
being at that time the beneficiary of three trusts set up by the deed
and wills of his parents. One trust directed that he receive the income
until he reached 28 years of age, at which time he became outright owner;
from the other trusts he was to receive income for life. All three
trusts gave him a general testamentary power of appointment over the
trust property whereby he could, in his sole discretion, appoint to anyone. In default of exercise of the power, the property was to go to
his descendants, or if he had none, to his brother and sisters and their
issue per stirpes. Decedent's attempt to exercise the power in favor
of his brother and sisters by a New York will was contested by his two
children who (1) denied the validity of the New York will and, (2)
challenging the right of the brother and sisters to take in default,
asserted their own right to do so. The brother and sisters claimed
under decedent's will and in the alternative as takers in default, contending that one child was precluded because of a prior separation
agreement and the other by reason of illegitimacy. These issues were
never finally resolved by judicial decision, and eventually a compromise
was entered into under which 37312% of the trust property went to
the brother and sisters. In a 5 to 4 decision'" the Supreme Court del*Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, - U. S. -,
Both the majority and minority
agreed that if the power of appointment were unexercised decedent did not have
such an interest in the trust property as to require its inclusion in his gross estate
under §302(a). This conclusion was based upon the legislative history of the
statute and upon implicationg from United States v. Field, 255 U. S.257, 41 S.Ct.
256, 65 L. ed. 617 (1921), rather than upon the economic equivalence of decedent's
rights to complete ownership. Thus the court refused to expand the scope of
§302(a) by the concept of "sibstantial ownership" which is developing under
§22(ay for income tax purposes. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
(1942) §4.12, p. 223. Except for the unavailability of the corpus, the ordinary life
estate coupled with a general power of appointment closely resembles a fee simple.
For this reason, the inclusion of such property under §302(a), even though the
power be unexercised, would perhaps have been not unreasonable, especially inasmuch as by so doing the court, at one stroke, could have escaped the complicated
question of apportionment raised by their actual decision, and also laid at rest any
possible doubt concerning the constitutionality of the taxation under the 1942
Revenue Act of property subject to an unexercised power of appointment. See
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company (1941-1943) C. C. H. Inheritance
Tax Service-State, 190, 530 (Ky. 1942), where the court at the end of its
opinion expresses doubts as to the ability of the legislature to tax property subject
to an unexercised power as a part of the donee's estate.

62 S. Ct. 925, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 851 (1942).
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cided that such part of this share as the brother and sisters received
because of their claim as appointees under decedent's will should be
included in decedent's gross estate for the purpose of computing the
Federal Estate Tax under §302(f) providing for the inclusion of prop2
erty passing by the exercise of a general power of appointment. *
Prior to the passage of the 1942 Federal Revenue Act,3 this decision represented perhaps as good a solution as was possible to an
extremely complicated and troublesome problem. It had been settled
that property subject to an unexercised power of appointment was not
includible in decedent's gross estate under §302(f) before the 1942
Amendment. 4 Property subject to a general power of appointment was
includible under §302(f) if the power was exercised and the property
passed pursuant to this exercise.3 Even where a general power was
validly exercised appointees under it, who were also takers in default
under the will of the donor of the power, could exempt the projerty
from the tax by electing to take in default rather than as appointees,
the property being considered as not having passed.0 The question involved in the instant case is how much, if any, of property subject to
a general power of appointment is to be considered as coming within
the scope of §302(f) so as to be includible in decedent's estate for the
purpose of the levy of the Federal Estate Tax, where an attempt has
been made to exercise the power, and the validity of this attempt has
never reached judicial decision but a compromise agreement gives the
attempted appointees some part at least of what they would have taken
as such.
Three possibilities are conceivable here: (1) to include none of the
property; (2) to include only part of the property; or (3) to include all
of the property. The four dissenting judges in the instant case took
2* Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 STAT. 9; 26 U. S. C. A. §811 (1940) : "§302.
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the

value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or in-

tangible, wherever situated-(f) (as amended by §803, Revenue Act of 1932, c.
209, 47 STAT. 169) To the extent of any property passing under a general power
of appointment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed

in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death, or (3) by deed under which he has retained for his life or any'period

not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death (A) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or (B) the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth."
'Federal Revenue Act of 1942, tit. IV, Part I, §403 a-f (1-2).
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935);
Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estates Tax (1939) 52 HARV.
L. Rxv. 929; 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942), c. 9.

Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
'Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
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the position that none of the property should be included, on the assumption that the attempted exercise of the power was invalid ;7 hence anything which the brother and sisters took came to them because of their
claim as takers in default and was thus outside the scope of §302(f).
These judges regarded Helvering z. Grinnells as supporting this point
0
of view, and indicated that the doctrine of Lyeth v. Hoey had no
application since in the instant case a state court had said that no property had passed by the exercise of the 'power. Furthermore, they felt
that the task of calculating the relative weight of the conflicting claims
so as to determine what part of the brother's and sisters' share came
to them through the bargaining force of the attempted exercise of the
power and what part did not was virtually impossible.
The majority decided that some part of the share going to the
brother and sisters under the compromise was attributable to the
attempted exercise of the power in decedent's will and should therefore
be included in decedent's gross estate under §302(f). This result was
reached by applying the reasoning of Lyeth v. Hoey'0 in which property received by an heir under a compromise settlement of his contest
of his ancestor's will was held to be property taken "by inheritance"
and hence not taxable as income, the rationale being that the taxation
of property distributed in compliance with the terms of a compromise
depends upon the factors which influenced the compromise. The court
indicated that the invalidity of the attempted exercise of the power had
never been carried to -final judicial decision and that it was a substantial factor in the compromise which was eventually reached,,- while
the alternative claim of the brother and sisters as takers in default was
extremely tenuous. Although this conclusion seems reasonable, it injects into every case of this character the tremendously complicated
issue of the relative effect of conflicting claims upon a compromise.
The majority felt, however, that the difficulty of evaluation should not
12
prevent taxation in accordance with the realities of the compromise.
Although rejected by both the majority and minority of the court,
the conclusion of the Tax Commissioner that all of the property should
be included seems about as sensible as saying that none of it should be.
Assuming that the validity of neither claim has reached judicial decision,
the argument is that the brother's and sisters' alternative claim as takers
in default was so tenuous as to have played no part in determining their
'Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).

8294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
p305 U. S. 196, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 125, 119 A. L:R. 410 (1934).
10305 U. S. 196, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 125, 119 A. L. R. 410 (1934).
"1Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).
"2Cf. United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 47 S. Ct. 608, 71 L. ed. 1054
(1926).
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share under the compromise, and that such share was entirely due to
their claim as appointees under decedent's will.
The 1942 Federal Revenue Act'"* amends §302(f) by providing
for the inclusion in decedent's gross estate of any property with respect
to which decedent has at the time of his death a general power of
appointment. Thus the tax is made to fall in accordance with the
shifting of economic benefit rather than according to strict property
rules under which it is determined whether any property passed through
the exercise of a general power. One effect of this amendment is the
future elimination under the Federal Estate Tax of the type of problem in the instant case where a will purporting to exercise a power of
appointment has been compromised. Since the requisite for inclusion
under §302(f) is now the mere existence of the power in decedent at
the time of his death, all the property subject to the power would be
included. The question whether any part of a compromise share is
attributable to the attempted exercise of a general power of appointment and the necessity for the calculation of the relative weight of conflicting claims are no longer present.
An analogous problem exists under state law. A provision expressly imposing the Inheritance Tax upon property in accordance with
compromises reached in will contests 14* was eliminated from the Rev-

enue Act of North Carolina in 1941.45 Evidently this change was
prompted by fear of the difficulties inherent in the situation of the
principal case, and a desire to have the tax levied in accordance with
the state of the probate records,'0 a result which has been reached
7
under similar statutes in a majority of states passing on the question.1
The particular problem of the taxability of property subject to a
power of appointment where an attempt to exercise the power by will
1"Federal Revenue Act of 1942, tit. IV, Part I, §403 a-f (1-2): "§403.
Powers of Appointment. (a) General rule-§811 (f) is amended to read as follows: (f) Powers of Appointment-(I) In general-To the extent of any property (A) with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his death a power
of appointment. . . ." This statute also provides for the taxation of property subject to special powers of appointment.
'*N. C. PuB. L. 1937, c. 127, §1 First, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§7880(1), First. "§1: A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of
any property, real or personal, or of any interest therein or income therefrom,
in trust or otherwise, to persons or corporations, in the following cases: First.
When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this state from any
person dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of the state; or
when the transfer is by settlement, contract or agreement, or by any court order
or otherwise, to any person or persons, by reason of claim or claims arising by
virtue of intestate laws, in controversies or contests as to the probate or construction of any will or wills, or any trust or other instrument executed or created
by any person dying seized-of the property while a resident of this state."
11 Inheritance and Estate Tax Laws of North Carolina, Schedule A-Revenue
Act of 1939 as amended by the General Assembly of 1941, Art. I, Schedule A,
Inheritance Tax, §1 First and Second.
11 19 N. C. L. REv. at p. 526 (1941).
'
See Note (1932) 78 A. L. R?. 716.
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has resulted in compromise, is not affected by this change since the
North Carolina Inheritance Tax Law contains a provision i s* similar
to the 1942 Federal Law whereby property subject to an unexercised
power of appointment is taxed as though the power had been exercised.
Hence whether property is to be taxed according to the terms of the
compromise or the state of the probate records, any part of it which
was subject to a power of appointment, exercised or not, would be taxed.
Nevertheless, since the North Carolina law imposes an inheritance
tax upon property subject to a power of appointment at a rate determined by the relationship of the recipient of the property to the donor
of the power,19 greater opportunities for obtaining lower rates are open
to the well-advised individual or institution under the present rule of
taxing according to the state of the probate records than under the
rule that the inheritance tax is to be levied in accordance with compromises in will contests. For example, property passing to strangers
is taxed at a higher rate than property passing to relatives. 20 A power
of appointment is exercised by will in favor of a stranger to the donor
of the power. A son of the donor who is a taker in default contests
the will. The parties can then agree that the will shall not be probated
with the result that the property goes by default to the son who then
pays an agreed share to the proponent of the will. Under the rule
of taxation according to the state of the probate records, all of the
property will then be taxed at the rate imposed upon sons of donors,
in spite of the fact that part of it actually went to a stranger who is
taxed at a higher rate. However, under the rule of taxation according
to the compromise, the property going to each party would be taxed at
21
the correct rate. *

"*N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1), Fifth. "Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property made either before or after the passage of this law, such
appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions
of this law in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment
relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed
or devised by such donee by will, and the rate shall be determined by.the relationship between the beneficiary under the power and the donor; and whenever any
person or corporation possessing such power of appointment so derived shall
omit or fail to exercise the same within the time provided therefor, in whole or
in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this law shall be deemed to
take place to the extent of such omission or failure in the same manner as though
the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by a
will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the
time of such omission or failure."
"sSee note 18 supra.

'ON. C. 'CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(3-5).
" See Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 295, 149 S. E. 321 (1929) ; Note (1929)
CoL. L. Rav. 1164. 'However, the usual result under this rule would be to keep
the property in lower brackets because the tax would then be levied after the
property had been split up according to the compromise.
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An examination of the Estate and Inheritance Tax Laws of other
states indicates a considerable variety of provisions for the taxation of
property subject to powers of appointment. These statutes fall into
three principal categories: (1) those which, like North Carolina, impose a tax upon property subject to a power of appointment not only
where the power is exercised but also where there has been an omission
or failure to exercise it, (2) those which tax only property which is
transferred through the exercise of a power, and (3) those in which no
specific reference is made to powers of appointment.
Twenty states impose a tax upon both the exercise and non-exercise
of a power of appointment. Nineteen of these states22 have an identical
statute. North Carolina and Florida, however, further provide that the
rate of taxation shall be determined by the relationship of the beneficiary under the power to the .donor, and the Kentucky statute contains
a proviso that the transfer shall be deemed to take place at the time of
the death of the donor and that the assessment shall be made at that
time. 23 Rhode Island specifically taxes property subject to either a
"general or limited" power. North Dakota, 24 in somewhat different
language, taxes transfers of property subject to both exercised and unexercised powers, but as of the estate of the -donor, not the donee, of
the power.
The statutes of thirteen states25 tax only property which is transferred through the exercise of a power of appointment, and no tax is
specifically imposed in the event of non-exercise. The statutes of Del22 Colorado, COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 85, §12; District of Columbia,
D. C. CODE (1940) §47-1601(j); Florida, FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, Supp., 1936) §1342(10) ; Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §14-402; Kansas,
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp., 1941) §79-1520; Kentucky, Ky. STAT.
ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §4281a-14; Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933), c. 65,
§2; Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1941) §7.561, Fourth; Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §2292(5); Missouri, Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §571;
Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) §10400.1(5);
New Mexico, N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1929) §141-1118; North Carolina,
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1), Fifth; Ohio, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1939) §5332(4) ; Rhode Island, R. I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 43, §§1, 4(3)
17, Acts of R. I. (1939), c. 664, §§1, 4(3), 18, p. 161; South Carolina, S. C. CODE
(1932) §2480(d); South Dakota, S. D. CODE (1939) §57.2104; West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §842(e); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. (1941)

§72.01 (5).

.supra.
Laws of N. D. (1933) c. 251, §2(5), p. 374.
"5Arizona, ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §40-105(5); Arkansas, ARK. DxG. STAT.
(Pope, 1937) §14001(8) ; California, CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8495
§2(6); Delaware, DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §135; Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. (SmithHurd, 1934) c. 120, §375(4); Iowa, IOWA CODE (1939) §7307; Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. (Supp., 1938) §1678(d); New Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940)
54:34-1, d. (2), 54:36-4; New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New
York, TAx LAW §220(4); Pennsylvania, PENN. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.,
1942) tit. 72, §2301(d); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §1260;
Texas, TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 7117; Washington,
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §11201-c.
2 See note 18
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aware, Illinois, New York, and Washington are couched in identical
language; New York and Washington, however, providing further that,
if at the time an appointment takes effect the 'donor of the power was a
resident and the donee was a non-resident, the appointed property shall
be taxable as having been transferred in the estate of the donor. Pennsylvania and Tennessee tax all property passing by the exercise of
powers of appointment as of the estate of the donor of the power rather
than that of the donee. The language of the Arizona and Mississippi
statutes is identical with that of the Federal law26 under which the

principal case was decided. California regards the gift of a power of
appointment as a taxable transfer from &lonorto donee at the date of
donor's death, and provides that where the donor died before the taking
effect of the statute that the subsequent exercise of the power shall be a
taxable transfer.
The Inheritance, Estate, Transfer, or Succession Tax Laws of
fifteen states27 do not specifically mention the taxation of property subject to powers of appointment. Connecticut, Maryland, Oklahoma, and
Virginia refer, however, to certain powers reserved in one who disposes of his property. Nevada28 has no Inheritance, Estate, Transfer,
or Succession Tax.
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.

See note 2 supra.

ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) tit. 51, §432; Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. (Supp., 1939) §395e; Georgia, GA. CODE (1933) §92-3401; Indiana,
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §6-2401; Louisiana, LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart,
1939) §§8556-8587; Maine, ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 77, §2; Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) Art. 81, §111, Laws of Md. of 1941, c. 790, §1; Nebraska,
NEB. COMP. STAT. (Supp., 1941) §77-2201; New Hampshire, N. H. PuB. L. (1926)
c. 72; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 68, §989e; Oregon, ORE. Comtp.
LAws ANN. (1940) §§20-101 to 20-156; Utah, UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933)
§80-12; Vermont, VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) §§1047-1122; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1936) Appx. Tax Code, §§98-120, TAx CODE (1942) §§98-120; Wyoming,
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1931) §§115-1201 to 115-1232.
11 Nay. Comip. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929).
17Alabama,

